We consider the problem of identifying coordinated influence campaigns conducted by automated agents or bots in a social network. We study several different Twitter datasets which contain such campaigns and find that the bots exhibit heterophily -they interact more with humans than with each other. We use this observation to develop a probability model for the network structure and bot labels based on the Ising model from statistical physics. We present a method to find the maximum likelihood assignment of bot labels by solving a minimum cut problem. Our algorithm allows for the simultaneous detection of multiple bots that are potentially engaging in a coordinated influence campaign, in contrast to other methods that identify bots one at a time. We find that our algorithm is able to more accurately find bots than existing methods when compared to a human labeled ground truth. We also look at the content posted by the bots we identify and find that they seem to have a coordinated agenda.
Introduction
Social networks face the challenge posed by automated bots which create spam in the network and result in a degraded user experience. However, recently these bots have become a serious threat to democracies. There have been multiple reports alleging that foreign actors attempted to penetrate U.S. social networks in order to manipulate elections (Parlapiano and Lee 2018 , Shane 2017 , Guilbeault and Woolley 2016 , Byrnes 2016 , Ferrara 2017 . The perpetrators used bots to share politically polarizing content, much of it fake news, in order to amplify it and extend its reach, or directly interacted with humans to promote their agenda. While no one knows exactly how many because many of these bots are coordinated, they may exhibit joint behaviors which are difficult to mask and which allow for more accurate and robust detection. These behaviors may not be observable by looking at accounts in isolation. Therefore, conventional algorithms which focus on individual detection may not find these bots. What is needed is an algorithm that can simultaneously detect multiple bots.
Our Contributions
We provide evidence that modern bots in the social network Twitter coordinate their attacks.
They do not create original content, but rather amplify certain human users by disproportionately retweeting them. We find that the bots exhibit heterophily, which means they interact with humans much more frequently than they interact with each other (Rogers 2010) . This is the opposite of the more common homophily phenomenon, where similar individuals interact with each other.
We use heterophily to design a new algorithm for bot detection. We utilize the Ising model from statistical physics to model the network structure and bot labels. We show that the maximum likelihood estimation of the bot labels in this Ising model reduces to solving a minimum cut problem, which allows for efficient estimation. Our algorithm scales to large networks and is much faster than modern bot detection algorithms (see Table 4 ).
A natural application of our algorithm is understanding the agenda of the bots' influence campaigns. We do this by analyzing the content of the detected bots. We find that the bots seem to promote certain geo-political issues.
We emphasize that our algorithm is language agnostic and relies only on the interaction network. Therefore, it can be used on social networks in many different countries without having prior knowledge of the language, culture, or individuals involved. Also, our algorithm is not restricted to Twitter, and can be used on any online platform where individuals can interact with one another (Facebook, Reddit, Instagram, etc.) .
Previous Work
Originating from spam detection (Sahami et al. 1998 ), a significant subset of bot detection algorithms are based on recognizing patterns of automation (Heymann et al. 2007 , Gyöngyi et al. 2004 , Gyöngyi and Garcia-Molina 2005 , Ntoulas et al. 2006 , Castillo et al. 2007 ). It was observed by Malmgren et al. (2009) and Raghavan et al. (2014) that human beings present specific circadian patterns which can further be used for strategic timing or promotion campaigns (Li et al. 2014, Modaresi et al.) , or, in our case, to discriminate humans from bots (Zhang and Paxson 2011 , Chu et al. 2012 , Ghosh et al. 2011 ). Posting at random times makes bots easily detectable, as shown in Gianvecchio et al. (2011) , but bots that retweet tweets of actual humans will replicate human rhythms with a lag.
Modern bots are no longer unintelligent spam accounts, and have learned how to mimic humans.
A meticulous study of the rise of social bots is presented in . Social bots are designed to interact with other users (Hwang et al. 2012 , Messias et al. 2013 , Boshmaf et al. 2013 , and post human-like content (Freitas et al. 2015) . Not only do bots look more human, but turn out to be half-human: Chu et al. (2012) mentions the concept of cyborgs, where a real person manages dozens of otherwise automated accounts. Such hybrid accounts 1 make the detection task extremely challenging (Zangerle and Specht 2014, Syeed and Frier 2017) .
Bot detectors also became more sophisticated, from the earliest instances (Yardi et al. 2009 ) to the current state of the art ) currently used in most applications today (Ferrara 2017 , Mønsted et al. 2017 , Vosoughi et al. 2018 , Badawy et al. 2018 ). In the authors present a taxonomy of bot detectors, from crowd-sourcing , Stein et al. 2011 , Elovici et al. 2014 and honeypot traps (Lee et al. 2011 , Paradise et al. 2017 , to user feature oriented classifiers , Chu et al. 2012 , Benevenuto et al. 2010 , Wang 2010 , Egele et al. 2013 , Viswanath et al. 2014 , Thomas et al. 2011 . Both approaches treat accounts individually, but do not detect coordinated attacks. Extant work exists for coordinated attacks, a few instances of which are CopyCatch for Facebook 'liked' pages (Beutel et al. 2013 ), Twitter memes (Ratkiewicz et al. 2011) , and more generally Sybil detection in online communities (Benevenuto et al. 2009 , Aggarwal 2014 , Cao et al. 2014 , Ghosh et al. 2012 , Tran et al. 2009 , Yu et al. 2008 , Danezis and Mittal 2009 , Yu et al. 2006 , Wang et al. 2013 , Alvisi et al. 2013 , Cao et al. 2012 ). Our algorithm is strongly inspired from work on image segmentation from Zabih and Kolmogorov (2004) , which was also applied to social networks in Marks and Zaman (2017) to detect user location. To the best of our knowledge, no model for bot-human heterophilic interactions on social networks exist, nor an efficient algorithm for joint bot detection based on such a model.
Data
We collected Twitter data from six different controversial events that occurred in a variety of nations Summers (2017b,a) . In addition to the basic content information, for each tweet we also collected the user profile.
Ground Truth Construction.
To obtain a ground truth for bot identities, we manually labeled approximately 300 accounts per event. The accounts were randomly selected and only required to have a minimum activity level. For each account, the labeler was given three options: human, bot, or no idea. The decision is guided by the activity patterns (number of retweets versus original tweets, volume, etc.), content of tweets (level of creativity, replies, topic diversity), and other profile features (pictures, followers/friends ratio, etc.). Some events occurred two or three years ago, but the labeling is based on the most recent 2018 activity. Therefore, labelers were also given quick statistics about the account's activity during the event, but were explicitly told not to weigh it too much into their final decision. Statistics for the number of accounts labeled as bots on each event are found in Table 2 . We found that approximately 10% of the accounts were labeled bots across the different datasets. We study the collective behavior of the bots. One such behavior concerns who the bots interact with or retweet. Figure 1 shows different networks of retweeting interactions in the Pizzagate dataset by accounts labeled by humans (see Table 2 ). We place the bots on the peripheral ring, humans in the central ring, and draw directed edges for the retweet interactions. Each network corresponds to different node types on the edges. We see qualitatively that bots prefer to retweet humans than other bots, and that humans prefer to retweet other humans instead of bots. This phenomenon where members of a group do not interact with each other, but do interact with members of different groups is known as heterophily. To obtain a more quantitative measure of heterophily, we broaden the set of ground truth labeled accounts by using a popular bot detection algorithm from . This algorithm provides a probability of being a bot. We chose 0.5 as our threshold for being a bot. Then for each account, we calculated the total number of retweets it gives to humans/bots, normalized by the number of unique humans/bots it retweets. This measures the average number of retweets per human and retweets per bot for each account. We refer to this quantity as the retweet rate. We then look at the distribution of the retweet rates conditioned on the nodes on each end of the retweet edges: human to human, human to bot, bot to human, and bot to bot. In Table 3 we show the mean retweet rates for the different retweet types. As can be seen, the bot to human mean is much higher than the bot to bot mean. Also, the human to human mean is higher than the human 7 to bot mean. To further quantify the difference, we perform a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test on each pair of retweet rate distributions. The p-value for the tests on each dataset are also shown in Table 3 . We find that there is a statistically significant difference between the distributions. This supports the hypothesis that there is heterophily for the bots. It also suggests that the humans exhibit homophily, meaning they are more likely to interact with each other than with bots. We will use these properties to design our bot detection algorithm. 
Joint Detection Using the Ising Model
In this Section, we present our joint classification model. We assume we have an interaction graph G = (V, E) of accounts with vertex set V (the accounts) and edge set E (the interactions). For each node u i ∈ V we observe features x i and for each pair of users u i , u j ∈ V we observe interaction features z ij . The interaction features could be the number of retweets, out degree, and in-degree.
Each node i in the network has a latent variable ∆ i which is one if i is a bot and zero otherwise. We use a factor graph to model the joint distribution of the observed features and latent
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variables. We define functions φ(x i , ∆ i ) for each i ∈ V and ψ(z ij , ∆ i , ∆ j ) for i, j ∈ V . We refer to φ and ψ respectively as the node energy and link energy functions. Then given N accounts in an interaction graph/network with node features
, the probability of the observed features and latent variables is
where Z is the partition function. A probability model of this form which involves products of functions of single nodes and pairs of nodes has the structure of the Ising model from statistical physics (Ising 1925) . Inference of the latent variables in general can be difficult because of the presence of the partition function. However, it has been shown that inference problem is much easier if one specifies certain characteristics of the model Kolmogorov 2004, Marks and Zaman 2017 ), which we do next.
Model Characteristics.
Link Energy. We begin by defining the link energy functions. First there is the case where there is no edge between nodes u i and u j . In this case we assume that we can infer nothing about the latent variables ∆ i and ∆ j , so we set the link energy to be independent of the latent variables. For simplicity, we assume that ψ(z ij , ∆ i , ∆ j ) = 0 when there is no edge between i and j.
For pairs of nodes with an edge, we choose a functional form for the link energy. Suppose node u 1 has z 1 retweets (its out-degree), node u 2 receives z 2 retweets (its in-degree), and u 1 retweets u 2 a total of w 12 times. If either degree is small, then the retweet edge from u 1 to u 2 provides little information about node labels because occasional retweets are very common on Twitter. For example, let u 1 be a human that retweeted u 2 once. If u 1 retweeted no one else, the edge (u 1 , u 2 )
would increase the probability that it is a bot, though it is not. In simpler terms, the only edges that contain information are the ones where u 2 happens to be a popular target and u 1 a suspiciously active retweeter. Using these insights and following Marks and Zaman (2017) we define the link energy as
where γ controls the weight of the link energy relative to the node energy, and α 1 , α 2 represent thresholds for the in and out-degrees.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, we require heterophily in our model between the bots, and homophily between the humans. This imposes the following constraint on the link energies when there is an edge from u i to u j (a high energy corresponds to small likelihood):
The constraints above simply say that if u i retweets u j , the most likely labeling is u i is a bot and u j is a human (ψ(z ij , 1, 0|u i → u j )), and the least likely is u i is a human and u j is a bot (ψ(z ij , 0, 1|u i → u j ) ). To parameterize these energies, we introduce the constants < λ 2 < λ 1 ∈ [0, 1]
and set the link energies to
For pairs of nodes with reciprocate edges u i → u j and u j → u i , the energy of the pair is the aggregate of the two one-way energies. In order to efficiently infer the latent labels, the constants λ 1 , λ 2 and must satisfy a set of constraints that we present in Section 4.
Node Energy. We choose a relatively simple form for the node energy. If we have no prior knowledge on which accounts are bots, we set φ(x i , 1) = φ(x i , 0) = 0. If we have prior knowledge, perhaps from an expert or another bot detection algorithm, we can use it for the node energy. However, it turns out the simple uninformative energy performs quite well.
Inference via Minimum Cut
To find the most likely values for the labels given observed values X and Z, we want to maximize equation (1), which is equivalent to solving
It has been shown that performing the optimization in equation (3) is equivalent to finding the minimum capacity cut on an appropriately defined graph (Boykov et al. 2001) . The expression in equation (3) can be viewed as the energy of the label configuration, so the graph on which the minimum cut is equal to the maximum likelihood label set is referred to as the energy graph. We now show how to construct this graph. Figure 2 illustrates how to map an interaction network/graph into an energy graph. There is a source node s and a sink node t in the energy graph. There are three types of edges in the energy graph. For each node u i in the interaction graph, there is an edge from the source and an edge to the sink: (s, u i ) and (u i , t). There are also edges between every pair of nodes with an interaction edge. For each node u i in the interaction graph, every valid s − t cut in the energy graph must either cut the edge (s,
cut, ∆ i = 1 and u i is a bot. This is how a cut in the energy graph maps to a label configuration.
By proper choice of the edge weights, a minimum weight cut in the energy graph will correspond to a maximum likelihood label configuration. We now define the edge weights following the results in Boykov et al. (2001) . For each pair of users u i , u j with an edge from u i to u j in the interaction graph, we add edges (u i , u j ) and (u j , u i ) in the energy graph with weights: 1, 1) ) .
For each user u i , the weight of the edge (s,
For each user u i , the weight of the edge
, where
It can easily be shown that with these edge weights, the weight of an s − t cut in the energy graph equals the energy of the corresponding label configuration in the interaction graph.
Energy Constraints. In order for the minimum weight cut to be the most likely labels, we need the energy graph edge weights to be positive. Also, from Boykov et al. (2001) , it was shown that the link energies had to satisfy the condition ψ(z, 1, 1) + ψ(z, 0, 0) ≤ ψ(z, 1, 0) + ψ(z, 0, 1). This condition made the energy function from equation (3) submodular and also solvable via minimum cut. Finally, we have the heterophily constraint from equation (2). We express these constraints in terms of λ 1 , λ 2 ,and . First, heterophily gives
Submodularity gives
for some δ ≥ 0. We choose δ = 0 and find that edge weight positivity gives
Results
In this section, we present the results of the performance of our bot detection algorithm based on the human labelers' ground truth. In addition to the 300 hand labeled accounts for each event,
we also include all the Twitter verified users. Verified users have undergone robust identity checks from Twitter in order to receive such label. This increases the number of ground-truth labels by approximately one to two thousand. We compare our performance to the state of the art bot detection algorithm known as BotOrNot . In the results presented, (α 1 , α 2 ) = (100, 100), except for BLM2016, where the volume of interactions is much bigger. There we set (α 1 , α 2 ) = (100, 1000). For all events we set γ = 1, λ 1 = 0.8, λ 2 = 0.6 and = 0.4. (λ 1 , λ 2 ) is picked as the barycenter of the feasible region defined by constraints (4), (6) while is determined by setting δ = 0 in (5) as we want as small as possible. As we consider the case of null node energies φ(x i , ∆ i ) = 0, the choice of γ does not impact the optimal cut, and only intervenes in computing the marginal probability of belonging to each class. We do not tune this parameter, and fix it to γ = 1, in order for the link energy differences to scale with the number of retweets w ij . To evaluate the algorithms performance, we use the inferred labels to calculate the marginal probability of being a bot for each node. This allows us to calculate receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for our algorithm and compare it to BotOrNot. We show the ROC curves in Figure   3 . In Table 4 we present the area under the curve (AUC) metric for the algorithms along with their run-time. We note that for BotOrNot, the run-time is the time it takes to query its API, which may include additional delays beyond computation time. Therefore, the runtimes for BotOrNot are an upper bound to the actual computational time. From Figure 3 and Table 4 it can be seen that our algorithm usually performs better than BotOrNot in terms of AUC. The one exception is BLM 2015. We suspect here that the coordinated bot campaigns we are trying to detect were not as prevalent. Our algorithm runs on several hundred thousand accounts in several minutes to a few hours.
We find that we have much fewer false positives than BotOrNot. One of the reason is that BotOrNot labels news broadcasting accounts as bots. Examples of this in our datasets include the Twitter accounts for Newsweek, CNN, and the New York Times.
2 Because our Ising model algorithm looks for who the accounts interact with and also who interacts with the accounts, we do not mistake 2 As per the documentation on their website, bot scores were updated on May 10, 2018. The later problem seems to have been fixed, since the aforementioned verified news broadcasting accounts are now given low bot scores. However, Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. (Please, provide the mansucript number!) these trusted news sources for bots. BotOrNot uses mainly the account behavior, so the high activity of these accounts make them appear like bots.
In addition to the increased accuracy and fast runtime, our algorithm relies on much less information than BotOrNot (recall that we use uninformative node energies). This shows that there is a great deal of information in the interaction graph which maps out the retweet behavior of the accounts.
Bot Agenda. A way to understand the underlying agenda of bot designers is by looking at the content of the tweets posted by the bots. After applying our bot detection algorithm to an event,
we look at the hashtags used by the bots, but not by the humans. Figure 4 illustrates the results of such analysis on the Pizzagate and Macron Leaks datasets.
In Pizzagate, the bots try to export the controversy outside of the US, by transforming the usual #WakeUpAmerica into # WakeUpBritain, and #WakeUpFrance. Similar intent can be seen in the Macron Leaks analysis, with the use of the #furherMerkel and #stopGlobalists hashtags. In both cases, it looks like bots intend to internationalize an otherwise local controversy in order to reach a broader audience, especially that of western Europe. It appears as if the bots are trying to shift the theme of the conversation to certain types of controversies (instability of Europe, Brexit, Frexit, etc.).
Conclusion
We have presented an Ising model for the probability of bot labels in a social network. Our model was motivated by the observation of heterophily in bot interactions. We infer the bot labels efficiently by solving a minimum cut problem. We find our joint detection algorithm outperforms current existing algorithms. This may be due to the fact that the bots are coordinated. Individual detection does not allow one to take advantage of the coordinated behavior. We also find that our algorithm is able to discern bot accounts from just active trusted news source accounts, in contrast to other popular regular users that have no bad intentions, but use automation softwares to gain popularity would still be mistaken with bots, although they are in no way involved in any influence campaign. algorithms. This is a result of our incorporation of the joint interactions of all accounts. Analysis of the content of the bots reveals that they seem to have an agenda focused on controversial topics.
We feel that for these types of coordinated campaigns, joint detection is much more effective than individual detection.
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